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Abstract
The problem of Secret Key Establishment (SKE) over a pair of independent Discrete Memoryless
Broadcast Channels (DMBCs) has already been studied in [3], where we provided lower and upper bounds
on the secret-key capacity. In this paper, we study the above setup under each of the following two cases:
(1) the DMBCs have secrecy potential, and (2) the DMBCs are stochastically degraded with independent
channels. In the former case, we propose a simple SKE protocol based on a novel technique, called
Interactive Channel Coding (ICC), and prove that it achieves the lower bound. In the latter case, we give
a simplified expression for the lower bound and prove a single-letter capacity formula under the condition
that one of the legitimate parties can only send i.i.d. variables.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the following problem of Secret Key Establishment (SKE): Alice and Bob want to share
a secret key in the presence of an eavesdropping adversary, Eve. Information-theoretic solutions to this
problem assume that a collection of sources and/or channels are available to the parties. We refer this as
a setup.
Wyner’s pioneering work [14] and its generalization by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4] considered transmission
of secure messages over a Discrete Memoryless Broadcast Channel (DMBC) from Alice to Bob and
Eve. They defined the secrecy capacity in this setup as the highest rate of secure and reliable message
transmission (in bits per channel use) and showed that this capacity is positive if Bob’s channel is less
noisy [8] than Eve’s. The work in [4], [14] has also been proved for the case of Gaussian channels [10].
These results can also be used for SKE since any secure message transmission protocol can be used to
send a secret-key securely over the DMBC.
Extensions of the work in [4], [14] have investigated the improvement of SKE by considering new
setups. Maurer [11] and independently Ahlswede and Csisza´r [1] studied SKE when there is a DMBC
from Alice to Bob and Eve, and a public discussion channel between Alice and Bob that is reliable,
insecure, and unlimitedly available in both directions. They also considered SKE when the DMBC above
is replaced by a Discrete Memoryless Multiple Source (DMMS) between the parties. Csisza´r and Narayan
[5] considered SKE in the latter setup with a slight difference that the public channel is one-way and
limited in rate. Ahlswede and Cai [2] studied SKE when Wyner’s setup is accompanied by an additional
secure (and reliable) output feedback channel that is used to feed back the information received from
the forward channel. Noisy feedback over modulo-additive broadcast channels is another extension [9],
[13]. Khisti et al. [7] and independently Prabhakaran et al. [12] considered a setup where the parties have
access to a DMMS and a DMBC from Alice to Bob and Eve.
2In practice special types of channel, e.g., public discussion channel, must be realized from more basic
resources such as a DMBC. In [3], we introduced a new setup for SKE, called 2DMBC, where the
only resources available to Alice and Bob are two independent DMBCs in the two directions. This
setup is appropriate to model wireless networks where two nodes can communicate interactively and
their communication is eavesdropped by their wireless neighbors. The secret-key capacity in this setup is
defined as the maximum rate of secure and reliable key establishment, in bits per channel use. Lower and
upper bounds on the secret-key capacity in the 2DMBC setup have been provided and shown to coincide
when the broadcast channels are physically degraded [3].
A. Our work
Motivated by applying the theoretical results to practical communication scenarios, in this paper, we
extend the results of [3] in the following directions.
1) We consider the 2DMBC setup when both DMBCs have secrecy potential, by which, we mean that
realizing a noiseless channel from any of the DMBCs is not optimal. In most of the channels of interest
(in communication), this occurs when the DMBCs have non-zero secrecy capacities. We propose a two-
round SKE protocol based on a novel technique, called Interactive Channel Coding (ICC) that achieves
the lower bound in [3]. This lower bound was proved before by a SKE protocol that, although being
convenient for the proof, uses an elaborate two-level coding construction whose efficient design becomes
a new challenge in practice. Instead, ICC is a simple extension of systematic channel coding to a two-
round construction in which the messages are essentially a codeword from a systematic error correcting
code, split into two parts: one received in the first round and one sent in the second round. Roughly
speaking, the ICC protocol works as follows. Alice sends a random sequence RA and Bob receives a
noisy version of it, IA. He chooses an independent random sequence, IB , and appends it to IA. We refer
to the concatenated sequence I = (IA||IB) as the information sequence. Bob uses his systematic encoder
to calculate a parity-check sequence P for the information sequence I , and sends (IB ||P ) to Alice, where
Alice receives (RB ||RP ). She uses her systematic decoder to decode R = (RA||RB ||RP ) to Iˆ = (IˆA||IˆB)
as an estimation of the information sequence. The rest is to generate a secure key from the information
sequence. ICC is particularly important as it allows progress in systematic capacity achieving codes to be
directly applied to SKE.
2) We study the 2DMBC setup when the DMBCs are stochastically degraded with independent channels.
We refer to this setup as sd-2DMBC. This study is motivated by observing that the results in [3] for the
secret-key capacity of (physically) degraded 2DMBCs do not necessarily hold for stochastically degraded
2DMBCs. In setups like [4], [5], [7], [12] that do not offer interactive communication, physically and
stochastically degraded broadcast channels are equivalent in terms of the secret-key capacity. This is not
true, however, for the 2DMBC setup in which interactive communication is permitted. Two important
classes of stochastically degraded channels with independent components are binary symmetric broadcast
channels and Gaussian broadcast channels. We note that our results can be easily extended to continuous
memoryless channels.
2-a) We give a simplified expression for the lower bound on the secret-key capacity in the sd-2DMBC
setup which uses fewer random variables and hence results in a simpler maximization problem.
32-b) We consider sd-2DMBC when one of the parties can only send only independently, identically
distributed (i.i.d) variables. We prove a single-letter formula for the secret-key capacity that is
achieved by a two-round protocol.
An example of the scenario (2-b) is when a base station wants to establish keys with several users in
different locations. The offline computation power of the base station is high but its realtime computation
power is limited. So, the base station sends i.i.d. variables in realtime and stores the received variables
from all other nodes in all communication rounds. Next, it calculates the common keys with each user
from the stored information in the offline mode. Our study of the above scenario provides a solution to
this problem.
B. Notation
We use calligraphic letters (U) to denote finite alphabets (sets), and the corresponding letters in
uppercase (U) and lowercase (u) to denote random variables (RVs) and their realizations, respectively.
The size of U is denoted by |U|. Un is set of all sequences of length n whose elements are in U ;
Un = (U1, U2, . . . , Un) is called an n-sequence, i.e., a sequence of n (possibly correlated) RVs in U ,
and U ji is used to denote a part of this sequence that is (Ui, Ui+1, . . . , Uj). We use ‘||’ to show the
concatenation of sequences. For a value x, we use [x]+ to show max{0, x}. For three random sequences
Q1, Q2, and Q3, we use Q1 ↔ Q2 ↔ Q3 to denote a Markov chain between them in this order.
C. Paper organization
Section II describes the 2DMBC setup, definitions, and existing SKE results in this setup. Section III
summarizes the main results of this paper. Section IV is dedicated to the proofs. We conclude the paper
in Section V.
II. MODEL, DEFINITIONS, AND EXISTING RESULTS
The 2DMBC setup is depicted in Fig. 1. There is a forward DMBC, Xf → (Yf , Zf ) specified by
PYf ,Zf |Xf , from Alice to Bob (and Eve) and a backward DMBC, Xb → (Yb, Zb) specified by PYb,Zb|Xb ,
from Bob to Alice (and Eve). We assume that each party has free access to an independent source of
randomness.
Forward DMBCXf
Yf
XZYP |
Eve
BobAlice
X
ZfZb
fff
Backward DMBC
bYb
bbb XZY
P |
Fig. 1. The 2DMBC setup
An SKE protocol in this setup may contain several communication rounds. In each round either Alice or
Bob sends a sequence of random variables (RVs) which is computed using some independent randomness
and the communicated (sent and/or received) sequences in the previous rounds. Finally each party will
4have a set of communicated sequences, which form their view. Using their views, one of the legitimate
parties computes a key S, and the other one computes an estimation of the key Sˆ. A secure SKE protocol
and the secret-key capacity in the 2DMBC setup are defined as follows.
Definition 1: [3] An SKE protocol Π in the 2DMBC setup is (Rsk, δ)-secure if it results in the key
S and its estimation Sˆ such that
H(S)
nf + nb
> Rsk − δ, (1a)
Pr(Sˆ 6= S) < δ, (1b)
H(S|V iewE)
H(S)
> 1− δ, (1c)
where V iewE is Eve’s view at the end of the protocol, and nf and nb are the number of times that the
forward and the backward channels are used, respectively.
Definition 2: [3] The secret-key capacity in the 2DMBC setup, C2DMBCsk , is the largest Rsk ≥ 0 such
that, for any arbitrarily small δ > 0, there exists an (Rsk, δ)-secure SKE protocol.
We recall the lower and the upper bounds given in [3] on the secret-key capacity in the 2DMBC setup.
Let the RVs Xf , Yf , Zf (resp. Xb, Yb, Zb) correspond to the conditional distribution PYf ,Zf |Xf (resp.
PYb,Zb|Xb), specified by the 2DMBC. Let Vf , Vb, W1,f ,W2,f , W1,b,W2,b be RVs from arbitrary sets where
Vf , Vb, (W1,f ,W2,f ), and (W1,b,W2,b) are independent and the following Markov chains are satisfied:
Vf ↔ Yf ↔ (Xf , Zf ), W2,b ↔ W1,b ↔ Xb ↔ (Yb, Zb), (2a)
Vb ↔ Yb ↔ (Xb, Zb), W2,f ↔W1,f ↔ Xf ↔ (Yf , Zf ). (2b)
Also let
RAs1 = I(Vf ;Xf )− I(Vf ;Zf ), (3a)
RAs2 = I(W1,b;Yb|W2,b)− I(W1,b;Zb|W2,b), (3b)
RBs1 = I(Vb;Xb)− I(Vb;Zf ), (3c)
RBs2 = I(W1,f ;Yf |W2,f )− I(W1,f ;Zf |W2,f ). (3d)
The secret-key capacity is lower bounded [3] as
C2DMBCsk ≥ max{LA, LB}, (4)
where
LA = max
nf ,nb,PXf ,Vf ,PXb,W2,b,W1,b
[
nfR
A
s1 + nb[R
A
s2]+
nf + nb
s. t. nfI(Vf ;Yf |Xf ) < nbI(W1,b;Yb)
]
, (5)
LB = max
nf ,nb,PXb,Vb ,PXf ,W2,f ,W1,f
[
nbR
B
s1 + nf [R
B
s2]+
nf + nb
s. t. nbI(Vb;Yb|Xb) < nfI(W1,f ;Yf )
]
, (6)
and it is upper bounded [3] as
C2DMBCsk ≤ max
PXf ,PXb
{I(Xf ;Yf |Zf ), I(Xb;Yb|Zb)}. (7)
5III. STATEMENT OF MAIN RESULTS
A. The interactive channel coding protocol
The lower bound in (4) has been obtained by an SKE protocol [3] that uses a complicated two-level
coding construction whose efficient design becomes a challenge in practice. We introduce the interactive
channel coding (ICC) technique which is used to design the so-called ICC protocol for SKE. We show
that when the DMBCs have secrecy potential, the ICC protocol can achieve the lower bound in (4). ICC
relies on the existence of capacity-achieving systematic channel codes. Designing efficient constructions
for systematic channel codes has been well studied, e.g., a large body of work on the design of capacity
achieving channel codes follows on linear block codes which can be represented as systematic codes.
This makes the design of an efficient ICC protocol for SKE as simple as the design of efficient coding
for SKE over a (one-way) DMBC [4].
Definition 3: A (bipartite) systematic channel code, with encoding alphabets (Yf ,Xb) and decoding
alphabets (Xf ,Yb), is specified by a pair of encoding/decoding functions (Enc/Dec), where
• Enc : Y
nf
f × X
nb,i
b → Y
nf
f × X
nb
b deterministically maps (y
nf
f ||x
nb,i
b ) (as the information sequence)
to the codeword (ynff ||x
nb
b ) such that x
nb
b = (x
nb,i
b ||x
nb,p
b ) and nb = nb,i + nb,p; we call x
nb,p
b the
parity-check sequence.
• Dec : X
nf
f ×Y
nb
b → Y
nf
f ×X
nb,i
b deterministically assigns a guess (yˆ
nf
f ||xˆ
nb,i
b ) to each input (x
nf
f ||y
nb
b ).
The general construction of the ICC protocol and a proof of Theorem 1 are provided in Section IV-A.
In the following, we describe the ICC protocol for a special case when Vf = Yf , W2,b = 1, W1,b = Xb,
and Alice is the initiator (see Fig. 2). Accordingly, we rephrase the argument to be maximized and the
constraint condition in (12) respectively as
Rsk =
nf [I(Yf ;Xf )− I(Yf ;Zf )] + nb[I(Xb;Yb)− I(Xb;Zb)]
nf + nb
, (8)
nf (H(Yf |Xf ) + α) ≤ nbI(Xb;Yb), (9)
where α > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant. Let nb = nb,i + nb,p, where nb,i is chosen to satisfy
nb,iH(Xb) = nbI(Xb;Yb)− nf (H(Yf |Xf ) + α). (10)
Let N = nf +nb and ǫ be a small constant such that 5Nǫ < nfα. Let Ynff,ǫ (resp. X nb,ib,ǫ ) be the set of all
ǫ-typical sequences w.r.t. PYf (resp. PXb) in Ynff (resp. X
nb,i
b ); Define
ηf = log |Y
nf
f,ǫ|, ηb = log |X
nb,i
b,ǫ |,
η = ηf + ηb, κ = NRsk, γ = η − κ.
Let {Gi}2
κ
i=1 be a partition of Y
nf
f,ǫ × X
nb,i
b,ǫ into 2κ parts, each of size 2γ . Define g : Y
nf
f,ǫ × X
nb,i
b,ǫ →
{1, 2, . . . , 2κ} as a function that, for every input (ynff , x
nb,i
b ) ∈ Gi, outputs i.
Encoding. Alice chooses an i.i.d. nf -vector Xnff and sends it over the forward DMBC; Bob and Eve
receive Y nff and Z
nf
f , respectively. If Y
nf
f /∈ Y
nf
f,ǫ, Bob returns a NULL; otherwise, he chooses uniformly
at random an nb,i-sequence Xnb,ib from X
nb,i
b,ǫ , encodes Enc(Y
nf
f ||X
nb,i
b ) = (Y
nf
f ||X
nb
b ), and sends X
nb
b
over the backward DMBC; Alice and Eve receive Y nbb and Z
nb
b , respectively.
Decoding. Alice decodes (Yˆf
nf
||Xˆ
nb,i
b ) = Dec(X
nf
f ||Y
nb
b ) using bipartite jointly typical decoding: she
searches through the 2η words in Ynff,ǫ×X
nb,i
b,ǫ and either finds a unique (Yˆ
nf
f , Xˆ
nb,i
b ) such that Enc(Yˆ
nf
f , Xˆ
nb,i
b )
6and (Xnff , Y
nb
b ) are (nf , ǫ)-bipartite jointly typical w.r.t. (PYf ,Xf , PXb,Yb) (see Section IV-A, Definition
7), or returns a NULL.
Key derivation. Bob computes S = g(Y nff ,X
nb,i
b ). Alice computes Sˆ = g(Yˆf
nf
, Xˆ
nb,i
b ).
Forward
DMBC
fn
fX
fn
fY
BobEveAlice fn
fZ
bn
bZ fn
fY
nˆ
Backward
DMBC
bn
bX
bn
bY
Systematic
Encoder ibn
bX
,
Systematic
Decoderibn
bX
,ˆ
f
fY
Fig. 2. ICC over a 2DMBC: Alice initiates the protocol
Theorem 1: Taking the variables from (2) and (3), the ICC protocol can achieve the secret-key rate
RICC = max{RICCA , R
ICC
B }, (11)
where
RICCA = max
nf ,nb,PXf ,Vf ,PXb,W2,b,W1,b
{
nfR
A
s1 + nbR
A
s2
nf + nb
s. t. nf [I(Vf ;Yf |Xf )] < nbI(W1,b;Yb)}, (12)
RICCB = max
nf ,nb,PXb,Vb ,PXf ,W2,f ,W1,f
{
nfR
B
s1 + nbR
B
s2
nf + nb
s. t. nb[I(Vb;Yb|Xb)] < nfI(W1,f ;Yf )}. (13)
Comparing (5) with (12), we conclude that RICCA and LA are equal if for the optimal selection of
the parameters, in the maximization problem of (5), RAs2 becomes non-negative. In other words, the two
values (rates) are equal if the backward DMBC has secrecy potential, i.e., the optimal strategy is not based
on realizing a noiseless channel from the backward DMBC. Similarly, RICCB equals LB if the forward
DMBC has secrecy potential.
Corollary 1: When the DMBCs have secrecy potential, the ICC protocol can achieve the lower bound
in (4).
B. The secret-key capacity in the sd-2DMBC setup
SKE over physically degraded 2DMBCs (pd-2DMBCs) was considered in [3], where we showed that
the lower and the upper bounds coincide and the capacity is achieved by a one-round SKE protocol. This
implies that interaction over a pd-2DMBC cannot increase the SKE rate. However, this is not generally
true for stochastically degraded broadcast channels, and the upper bound in (7) does not necessarily
coincide with the lower bound in (4) for stochastically degraded DMBCs. In this paper, we consider SKE
over a 2DMBC, where each DMBC is stochastically degraded with independent channels. We refer to
this setup as sd-2DMBC.
Definition 4: The DMBC X → (Y,Z), with conditional distribution PY Z|X , is stochastically degraded
in favor of Y (or the party who receives Y ) if there exist two RVs Y˜ and Z˜ such that X ↔ Y˜ ↔ Z˜
forms a Markov chain and
PXY (x, y) = PX,Y˜ (x, y), PXZ(x, z) = PX,Z˜(x, z).
7It consists of independent channels if PY Z|X = PY |X .PZ|X .
Definition 5: A sd-2DMBC is a 2DMBC whose DMBCs are stochastically degraded (either in favor of
Y or in favor of Z), and consist of independent channels.
1) Lower bound:
Proposition 1: The secret-key capacity in the sd-2DMBC setup is lower bounded as
Csd−2DMBCsk ≥ max{L
′
A, L
′
B}, (14)
where
L′A= max
nf ,nb,PVf ,Xf ,Xb
{
nfI(Vf ;Xf |Zf ) + nb[I(Xb;Yb)− I(Xb;Zb)]+
nf + nb
s. t. nf [I(Vf ;Yf |Xf )] < nbI(Xb;Yb)}, (15)
L′B= max
nf ,nb,PVb,Xb,Xf
{
nbI(Vb;Xb|Zb) + nf [I(Xf ;Yf )− I(Xf ;Zf )]+
nf + nb
s. t. nb[I(Vb;Yb|Xb)] < nfI(Xf ;Yf )}. (16)
The expressions (15) and (16) do not contain the RVs W1,b,W2,b,W1,f , and W2,f , compared to (5) and
(6). So, the maximization problem in obtaining the lower bound (14) is easier than that in (4).
2) single-letter characterization: We consider a scenario where one of the legitimate parties can only
send i.i.d. variables, and derive an expression for the secret-key capacity under this condition.
Theorem 2: When one of the legitimate parties can only send i.i.d. variables, the secret-key capacity
in the sd-2DMBC setup equals
max{L′A, L
′
B}, (17)
where L′A and L′B are given in (15) and (16), respectively.
IV. PROOFS
A. Proof of Theorem 1, the ICC protocol
We describe the ICC protocol when Alice is the initiator and prove that it achieves the rate in (12).
In a similar way, one can describe ICC when Bob initiates the protocol and prove (13). First we give
the following definitions from [3] for bipartite typical sequences. A bipartite sequence XN = (Un||T d),
where N = n+d, is the concatenation of two subsequences, Un ∈ Un and T d ∈ T d, with two probability
distributions, PUn and PT d , respectively.
Definition 6: A sequence xN = (un||td) is an (ǫ, n)-bipartite typical sequence with respect to the
probability distribution pair (PU (u), PT (t)), iff
| −
1
N
logP (xN )−
nH(U) + dH(T )
N
| < ǫ, (18)
where P (xN ) is calculated as
P (xN ) =
n∏
i=1
PU (ui)×
d∏
i=1
PT (ti). (19)
Definition 7: A pair of sequences (xN , yN ) = ((un||td), (u′n||t′d)) is an (ǫ, n)-bipartite jointly typical
pair of sequences with respect to the probability distribution pair (PU,U ′(u, u′), PT,T ′(t, t′)), iff xN
8and yN are (ǫ, n)-bipartite typical sequences with respect to the marginal probability distribution pairs
(PU (u), PT (t)) and (PU ′(u′), P ′T (t′)), respectively, and
| −
1
N
logP (xN , yN )−
nH(U,U ′) + dH(T, T ′)
N
| < ǫ, (20)
where P (xN , yN ) is calculated as
P (xN , yN ) =
n∏
i=1
PU,U ′(ui, u
′
i)×
d∏
i=1
PT,T ′(ti, t
′
i). (21)
Back to the proof, let the RVs Vf ,Xf , Yf , Zf , and W1,b,W2,b,Xb, Yb, Zb be the same as defined in
Theorem 1 such that the Markov chains in (2) are satisfied. Also let nf and nb be integers that satisfy
the constraint condition in (12). For simplicity, we use W1,W2, and V to refer to W1,b,W2,b, and Vf ,
respectively. Accordingly, we write the argument to be maximized in (12) as
Rsk =
nfR
A
s1 + nbR
A
s2
nf + nb
(22)
where
RAs1 = I(V ;Xf )− I(V ;Zf ), (23a)
RAs2 = I(W1;Yb|W2)− I(W1;Zb|W2), (23b)
and we rephrase the constraint condition in (12) as
nbI(W1;Yb) ≥ nf (I(V ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α), (24)
where α > 0 is an small constant to be determined (later) from δ. We shall show that for any given δ > 0,
for sufficiently large nf and nb that satisfy (24), the three requirements in (1) can be satisfied.
Let N = nf + nb and ǫ, β > 0 be small constants determined from α such that 3Nǫ < nbβ = nfα.
Let nb = nb,1 + nb,2, where nb,2 is chosen to satisfy
nb,2I(W1;Yb) = nf (I(V ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α). (25)
Define
ηf = nf [I(V ;Yf ) + α], ηf,2 = nb,2I(W2;Yb), ηf,1 = ηf − ηf,2, (26)
ηb = nb,1[I(W1;Yb)− β], ηb,2 = nb,1I(W2;Yb), ηb,1 = ηb − ηb,2, (27)
η1 = ηf,1 + ηb,1, η2 = ηf,2 + ηb,2, η = ηf + ηb, (28)
κ = (nf + nb)Rsk, γ = η − κ. (29)
Although the quantities obtained in (25)-(29) are real values, for sufficiently large nb and nf , we can
approximate them by integers. Since β can be made arbitrarily small, we can assume ηb and ηf are
non-negative. Furthermore, since
η = ηf + ηb
(a)
= nf [I(V ;Yf ,Xf ) + α] + nb,1[I(W1, Yb)− β]
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nfI(V ;Yf |Xf ) + nfα+ nb,1I(W1, Yb)− nb,1β
(b)
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nb,2I(W1, Yb)− 2nfα+ nb,1I(W1, Yb)− nb,1β
≥ nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1, Yb)− 3nfα ≥ R
A
s1 +R
A
s2 − 3nfα
≥ κ− 3nfα,
9for arbitrarily small α, we can assume η ≥ κ and so γ is non-negative. Equality (a) above is due to (26),
(27), and the Markov chain Xf ↔ Yf ↔ V , and equality (b) follows from (25). The following sets and
functions are used in the design of the ICC protocol.
(i) Vnf is the set of all possible nf -sequences with elements from V . Create Vnfǫ by randomly and
independently selecting 2ηf ǫ-typical sequences (w.r.t. PV ) from Vnf .
(ii) Let f : Vnfǫ → F = {1, 2, . . . , 2ηf } be an arbitrary bijective mapping; denote its inverse by f−1.
(iii) let {Fi}2ηf,2i=1 be a partition of F , into 2ηf,2 equal-sized parts. Label elements of part i as Fi =
{fi,j}
ηf,1
j=1. Define find : F → {1, . . . , 2ηf,2}×{1, . . . , 2ηf,1} such that find(f) = (i, j), if f is labeled
by fi,j .
(iv) Wnb,11 is the set of all possible sequences W nb,11 . Create Wnb,11,ǫ by randomly selecting 2ηb different
ǫ-typical sequences (w.r.t. PW1) from Wnb,11 .
(v) Let b :Wnb,11,ǫ → B = {1, 2, . . . , 2ηb} be an arbitrary bijective mapping; denote its inverse by b−1.
(vi) In analogy to F , let {Bi}2ηb,2i=1 be a partition of B where Bi = {bi,j}2
ηb,1
j=1 . Define bindx : B →
{1, . . . , 2ηb,2} × {1, . . . , 2ηb,1} such that bindx(b) = (i, j), if b is labeled by bi,j .
(vii) Let {Gi}2κi=1 be a partition of F × B into parts of size 2γ . Define g : F × B → {1, 2, . . . , 2κ} such
that, for any input in Gi, it outputs i.
(viii) Define the parity-check book P2 as a the collection of 2η2 words {wnb,22,f2,b2 : f2 = 1, 2, . . . , 2ηf,2 , b2 =
1, 2, . . . , 2ηb,2}, where each codeword wnb,22,f2,b2 is of length nb,2 and is independently generated
according to the distribution
nb,2∏
i=1
p(W2 = w2,f2,b2(i)).
(ix) For each wnb,22,f2,b2 , Define the parity-check book P1(w
nb,2
2,f2,b2
) as a the collection of 2η1 words {wnb,21,f2,b2,f1,b1
: f1 = 1, . . . , 2
ηf,1 , b1 = 1, . . . , 2
ηb,1}, where each codeword wnb,21,f2,b2,f1,b1 is of length nb,2 and is
independently generated according to the distribution
nb,2∏
i=1
p(W1 = w1,f2,b2,f1,b1(i)|W2 = w2,f2,b2(i)).
(x) Let Enc : Vnf × Wnb,11 → Vnf × Wnb1 be a (bipartite) systematic encoding function such that
Enc(vnf , w
nb,1
1 ) = (v
nf , wnb1 ), where w
nb
1 = (w
nb,1
1 , w
nb,2
1,f2,b2,f1,b1
), using the above parity-check
books when f = f(vnf ), b = b(Wnb,11 ), (f2, f1) = find(f), and (b2, b1) = bind(b).
(xi) Let DMCW be the DMC, W1 → Xb, that is specified by PXb|W1 .
Encoding. Alice selects an i.i.d. nf -sequence Xnff and sends it over the forward DMBC. Bob and Eve
receive Y nff and Z
nf
f , respectively. Bob finds a V nf ∈ V
nf
ǫ that is ǫ-jointly typical with Y nff (w.r.t.
PV,Yf ), or returns a NULL if he fails. He selects independently a uniformly random W nb,11 ∈ Wnb,11,ǫ .
He computes F = f(V nf ), B = b(W nb,11 ), (F2, F1) = find(F ), and (B2, B1) = bind(B), and calculates
Enc(V nf ,W
nb,1
1 ) = (V
nf ,W nb1 ) using these variables. Next, Bob inputs W
nb
1 to DMCW to compute
Xnbb , and sends X
nb
b over the backward DMBC. Alice and Eve receive Y
nb
b and Z
nb
b , respectively.
Decoding. Alice searches through Vnfǫ × Wnb,11,ǫ and either finds a unique (Vˆ nf , Wˆ
nb,1
1 ) that is (ǫ, nf )-
bipartite jointly typical to (Xnff , Y nbb ) w.r.t. (PV,Xf , PW1,Yb), or returns a NULL.
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Key Derivation. Bob computes S = g(F,B). Alice computes Fˆ = f(Vˆ nf ) and Bˆ = b(Wˆ nb,11 ), and then
Sˆ = g(Fˆ , Bˆ).
Fig. 3 shows the relationship between the random variables/sequences used in the ICC protocol. Two
variables/sequences are connected by an edge if (1) they belong to input/outputs of the same DMBC, or
(2) one is computed from the other by Alice or Bob using a (possibly randomized) function.
fnX n n F
1F 2F
f
f
fY
fV
fn
fZ
BobAlice Eve
bnW1
bn
bX
bn
bY
bn
bZ
B
1B 2B
1,bnW
F
1
V
B
Alice
Bob
(a) Encoding and decoding
BobAlice Eve
Fˆ
fnVˆ
),( bf
n
b
n
f YX Sˆ
bnW1
ˆ
Bˆ1,1
ˆ bnW
Alice
Bob
(b) Key derivation by Alice
Eve
BobAlice
f
F
S
SB
B
Alice
Bob
(c) Key derivation by Bob
Fig. 3. The relation between the variables/sequences used in the ICC protocol for (a) encoding/decoding, (b) key derivation by
Alice, and (c) key derivation by Bob
Uniformity Analysis: Proving (1a)
From AEP for PV (see [3, Appendix A] for more details), and since F and V nf have the same distribution,
∀f ∈ F , Pr(F = f) ≤ 2−ηf+5Nǫ. (30)
⇒ ηf − 5Nǫ ≤ H(V
nf ) = H(F ) ≤ ηf , (31)
Since W nb,11 (resp. B) is selected uniformly at random from Wnb,11,ǫ (resp. B) of size ηb
∀b ∈ B, Pr(B = b) = 2−ηb (32)
⇒ H(W
nb,1
1 ) = H(B) = ηb. (33)
For every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2κ}, the probability that S = i equals to the probability that (F,B) ∈ Gi. More
specifically (see (28) and (29)),
∀i : Pr(S = i) =
∑
f,b∈Gi
Pr(F = f ∧B = b) ≤ 2γ2−ηf+5Nǫ2−ηb = 2γ2−η+5Nǫ = 2−(κ−5Nǫ)
⇒
H(S)
nf + nb
≥
κ− 5Nǫ
nf + nb
= Rsk − δ, δ ≥ 5ǫ. (34)
Reliability Analysis: Proving (1b)
Since there are ηf = nf [I(V ;Yf ) + α] sequences in Vnfǫ , from joint-AEP, with probability arbitrarily
close to 1, there exists a V nf ∈ Vnfǫ that is ǫ-jointly typical with Y nff (w.r.t. PV,Yf ) and the encoding
phase is successful. In the decoding phase, Alice needs to search through the 2η words in Vnfǫ ×Wnb,11,ǫ ,
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where η is calculated as
η = ηf + ηb
(a)
= nf (I(V ;Yf ) + α) + nb,1(I(W1;Yb)− β)
(b)
= nf (I(V ;Yf ) + α) + nbI(W1;Yb)− nf (I(Vf ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α)− nb,1β
(c)
= nf (I(V ;Xf , Yf ) + α) + nbI(W1;Yb)− nf(I(Vf ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α)− nb,1β (35)
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb)− 2nfα− nb,1β
< nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb)− 9Nǫ. (36)
Equality (a) follows from (26) and (27), equality (b) follows from (25), and equality (c) is due to the
Markov chain Xf ↔ Yf ↔ V . Since η is sufficiently smaller than nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb), from
AEP for bipartite sequences (see [3, Theorem 4]), there exist an encoding function Enc(.) for which the
decoding error probability becomes arbitrarily close to 0. This implies that
Pr(Sˆ 6= S) ≤ Pr
(
(Fˆ , Bˆ) 6= (F,B)
)
= Pr
(
(Vˆ nf , Wˆ
nb,1
1 ) 6= (V
nf ,W
nb,1
1 )
)
< δ.
Secrecy Analysis: Proving (1c)
We shall show that the H(S|Znff , Z
nb
b ) is close to H(S). For the quantities H(F2) and H(B2), we have
(see [3, Appendix A] for more details)
ηf,2 − 5Nǫ ≤ H(F2) ≤ ηf,2, (37)
⇒ H(B2) = ηb,2. (38)
We write H(S|Znff , Z
nb
b ) as
H(S|Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )≥H(S|F2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
=H(S,F,B|F2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )−H(F,B|S,F2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
=H(F,B|F2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )−H(F,B|S,F2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
=H(F,B|F2, B2)− I(F,B;Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b |F2, B2)−H(F,B|S,F2, B2, Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ). (39)
The first term above is written as
The first term is written as
H(F,B|F2, B2) = H(F |F2, B2) +H(B|F,F2, B2)
(a)
= H(F |F2) +H(B|B2)
(b)
= H(F ) +H(B)−H(F2)−H(B2)
(c)
≥ ηf − 5Nǫ+ ηb − ηF,2 − ηb,2
(d)
≥ nfI(V ;Yf )− 2Nǫ+ nb,1[I(W1;Yb)− β]− nb,2I(W2;Yb)− nb,1I(W2;Yb)
(e)
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nfI(V ;Yf |Xf )− 2Nǫ+ nb,1I(W1;Yb)− nbI(W2;Yb)− nb,1β
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nf (I(V ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α) + nb,1I(W1;Yb)− nbI(W2;Yb)− 3nfα− nbβ − 2Nǫ
(f)
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nb,2I(W1;Yb) + nb,1I(W1;Yb)− nbI(W2;Yb)− 3nfα− nbβ − 2Nǫ
> nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb)− nbI(W2;Yb)− 14Nǫ
(g)
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb|W2)− 14Nǫ (40)
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Equality (a) holds since B2 and B are selected independently of F2 and F , equality (b) holds since F2
and B2 are deterministic functions of F and B, respectively (the encoding phase), inequality (c) follows
from (31), (33), (37), and (38), equality (d) follows from (26) and (27), equality (e) is due to the Markov
chain Xf ↔ Yf ↔ V , equality (f) follows from (25), and equality (g) is due to the Markov chain
W2 ↔W1 ↔ Yb.
The second term in (39) is written as
I(F,B;Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b |F2, B2)= I(F,B;Z
nf
f |F2, B2) + I(F,B;Z
nb
b |Z
nf
f , F2, B2)
(a)
=I(V nf , B;Z
nf
f |F2, B2) + I(F,B;Z
nb
b |Z
nf
f , F2, B2)
(b)
≤ I(V nf ;Z
nf
f ) + I(F,B;Z
nb
b |F2, B2)
(c)
= I(V nf ;Z
nf
f ) +H(Z
nb
b |F2, B2)−H(Z
nb
b |F,B)
(d)
≤nfI(V ;Zf ) + nb[H(Zb|W2)−H(Zb|W1)]
(e)
≤nfI(V ;Zf ) + nbI(W1;Yb|W2) (41)
Inequality (a) holds because V nf = f−1(F ) (the key derivation phase), equality (b) is due to the Markov
chains (F2, B2) ↔ (V nf , B) ↔ Znff , B ↔ V
nf ↔ Z
nf
f and Z
nf
f ↔ F ↔ Z
nb
b , equality (c) holds since
F2 and B2 are deterministic functions of F and B, equality (d) follows from AEP, and equality (e) is due
to the Markov chain W2 ↔W1 ↔ Zb.
It remains to calculate H(F,B|S,F,B,Znff , Z
nb
b ), i.e., the third term in (39). From (vii), knowing S = i
gives the partition Gi that F,B belongs to; further, knowing F2 = f2 and B2 = b2 gives the parity-check
sequence wnb,12,f2,b2 ∈ P2 which is used in the encoding phase (see (viii)). Define the codebook
Cei = {v
nf , wnb1 : (f(v
nf ), b) ∈ Gi, w
nb
1 = Enc(f(v
nf ), b), F2 = f2, B2 = b2}.
Given S = i, Znff , and Z
nb
b , one can search all the codewords in Cei and return a unique Vˇ nf , Wˇ
nb
1 ∈ C
e
i
that is (ǫ, nf )-bipartite jointly typical to (Znff , Znbb ) w.r.t. (PV,Zf , PW1,Zb); otherwise return a NULL. From
(vii), |Gi| = 2γ , and so |Cei | = 2γ−η2 , where η2 is given in (28). We first calculate η which is used in the
calculation of γ − η2.
η = ηf + ηb
= nf (I(V ;Yf ) + α) + nb,1I(W1;Yb)− nbβ
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nf (I(V ;Yf |Xf ) + 3α) + nb,1I(W1;Yb)− 2nfα− nbβ
= nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb)− 3nfα.
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γ − η2 is written as
γ − η2
(a)
= η − (nf + nb)Rsk − ηf,2 − ηb,2
(b)
≤ nfI(V ;Xf ) + nbI(W1;Yb)− 3nfα+ nf [I(V ;Zf )− I(V ;Xf )]
+nb[I(W1;Zb|W2)− I(W1;Yb|W2)]− nb,2I(W2;Yb)− nb,1I(W2;Yb)
= nbI(W1;Yb)− 3nfα+ nfI(V ;Zf ) + nb[I(W1;Zb|W2)− I(W1;Yb|W2)]− nbI(W2;Yb)
(c)
= nfI(V ;Zf ) + nbI(W1;Zb|W2)− 3nfα
(d)
< nfI(V ;Zf ) + nbI(W1;Zb)− 9Nǫ.
Equality (a) follows from (28) and (29), inequality (b) follows from the definition of Rsk in (22), equality
(c) is due to the Markov chain W2 ↔ W1 ↔ Yb, and inequality (d) is due to the Markov chain W2 ↔
W1 ↔ Zb. Since γ−η2 is sufficiently smaller than nfI(V ;Zf )+nbI(W1;Zb), from joint-AEP for bipartite
sequences [3, Theorem 4], for an appropriately chosen partition {Gi}2κi=1, the decoding error probability
becomes arbitrarily close to 0, i.e., given (S,F2, B2, Znff , Z
nb
b ),
Pr
(
(Vˇ nf , Wˇ nb1 ) 6= (V
nf ,W nb1 )
)
< 2ǫ.
Letting Fˇ = f(Vˇ nf ) and Bˇ, Fˇ = Enc(Wˇ nb1 ), we have
Pr
(
(Fˇ , Bˇ) 6= (F,B)
)
< 2ǫ.
Using Fano’s inequality [6] results in
H(F,B|S,F,B,Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ) ≤ H(F,B|Fˇ , Bˇ) < h(2ǫ) + 2ǫη, (42)
where h(ǫ) = −ǫ log(ǫ) − (1 − ǫ) log(1 − ǫ) is the binary entropy function. Applying (40)-(42) in (39)
gives
H(S|Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ) > nf [I(V ;Xf )− I(V ;Zf )] + nb[I(W1;Yb|W2)− I(W1;Zb|W2)]
−14Nǫ− h(2ǫ)− 2ǫη
= (nf + nb)Rsk − 14Nǫ− h(2ǫ) − 2ǫη
≥ H(S)− 14Nǫ− h(2ǫ) + 2ǫη,
where the last inequality follows from (34). This implies that by appropriate selection of ǫ for an arbitrarily
small δ, we will have
H(S|Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b )
H(S)
> 1− δ.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
From (2a) and the independence of the two DMCs in the sd-2DMBC setup (see Definitions 4 and 5),
Vf ↔ Yf ↔ Xf ↔ Zf forms a Markov chain, and so we write (3a) and (3c) as
RAs1=I(Vf ;Xf , Zf )− I(Vf ;Zf ) = I(Vf ;Xf |Zf ), (43)
RBs1=I(Vb;Xb, Zb)− I(Vb;Zb) = I(Vb;Xb|Zb). (44)
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From Definition 4 and the second Markov chain in (2a), there exist Y˜b and Z˜b such that one of the
Markov chains
W2,b ↔W1,b ↔ Xb ↔ Y˜b ↔ Z˜b, or (45a)
W2,b ↔W1,b ↔ Xb ↔ Z˜b ↔ Y˜b (45b)
hold, and
I(Xb;Yb) = I(Xb; Y˜b), I(Xb;Zb) = I(Xb; Z˜b)
I(W1,b;Yb|W2,b) = I(W1,b; Y˜b|W2,b),
I(W1,b;Zb|W2,b) = I(W1,b; Z˜b|W2,b).
Hence, we write (3b) as
RAs2 = I(W1,b; Y˜b|W2,b)− I(W1,b; Z˜b|W2,b)
≤ I(W1,b; Y˜b|Z˜b,W2,b)
(a)
≤ I(Xb; Y˜b|Z˜b)
= [I(Xb; Y˜b)− I(Xb; Z˜b)]+ = [I(Xb;Yb)− I(Xb;Zb)]+. (46)
Inequality (a) follows from (45). More precisely, if (45a) holds the inequality is easily satisfied, and if
(45b) holds both sides equal zero. It is easy to see that equality in (46) holds by choosing W2,b = 1 and
W1,b to be Xb or 1, in the case of (45a) or (45b), respectively. In analogy to the above, we have
RBs2 ≤ [I(Xf ;Yf )− I(Xf ;Zf )]+, (47)
where equality holds for some W2,f and W1,f . By replacing RAs1, RAs2, RBs1, and RBs2 in (5) and (6) with
the above-obtained quantities, (4) is simplified to (14).
C. Proof of Theorem 2
We let Alice be the party who sends i.i.d. variables. The other case follows by symmetry. We use
Lemma 1 to reduce a multi-round SKE protocol to a two-round one, and then give the highest rate that
a two-round protocol can achieve.
Lemma 1: When Alice can only send i.i.d. variables, the secret-key capacity is achieved by a two-round
SKE protocol whose initiator is Alice.
Proof: Let Π be a t-round SKE protocol that achieves the secret-key capacity under the above
condition.
Case 1: Alice sends in odd rounds. In any (odd) round r, Alice’s sent sequence X :rf is independent of her
view in round r− 1, and hence she could compute it in the first communication round. Besides, sending
this sequence in the first round does not affect the distribution of Bob’s and Eve’s received sequences (Y :rf
and Z :rf ) since the channels are memoryless. Obviously Bob can compute X :rb for any even r as before.
Hence, we can convert the protocol Π into Π′ in which Alice sends the whole ||(odd)r≤t
[
X
nf,r :r
f
]
in the
first round such that all the communicated sequences and the final key in Π and Π′ have the same joint
probability distribution, i.e., if the same randomness is chosen by Alice, Bob, and the 2DMBC in the
execution of Π and Π′, then all the communicated sequences and the final key are identical. Now, Bob
can send the whole ||(even)r≤t
[
X
nb,r :r
b
]
in the second round without affecting the joint distribution of the
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sequences. We refer to this last protocol as Π′′ which is a two-round protocol with Alice as the initiator
such that the communicated sequences and the key have the same joint distribution as in Π. Hence Π′′
achieves the secret-key capacity.
Case 2: Alice sends in even rounds. Using a similar argument to that of Case 1, we reach a three-round
protocol Π′′ with Bob as the initiator: Bob sends Xnb,1:1b in the first round, Alice sends ||(even)r≤t
[
X
nf,r :r
f
]
in the second round, and Bob sends ||(odd)3≤r≤t
[
X
nb,r :r
b
]
in the third round. Since the communicated
sequence in the first round is not used to calculate the second round communicated sequences, Bob can
send Xnb,1:1b in the third round without affecting the distribution of the sequences in the protocol Π′′. This
gives a two-round communication protocol with Alice as the initiator that achieves the capacity.
Now, consider a two-round SKE protocol as depicted in Fig. 4 in which Alice sends a sequence of i.i.d.
variables Xnff in the first round. Since the channels are memoryless and independent, Bob and Eve receive
sequences of i.i.d. variables Y nff and Z
nf
f and Yf ↔ Xf ↔ Zf is a Markov chain. This can be seen as the
Discrete Memoryless Multiple Source (DMMS) (Yf ,Xf , Zf ) between Bob, Alice, and Eve, respectively
and the DMBC Xb → (Yb, Zb) from Bob to Alice and Bob. When the DMMS and DMBC satisfy the
degradedness condition Yf ↔ Xf ↔ Zf and Xb ↔ Yb ↔ Zb, [7] proves an upper bound on the secret-key
capacity that coincides with the lower bound in (14). However, the proof in [7] can not be directly applied
to our problem due to the “stochastic” degradedness of the (backward) DMBC. We give the following
argument to upper bound the highest achievable rate Rsk for an arbitrarily small δ > 0 as in (1).
Bob
fn
fX
fn
fY
fn
fZ
Alice Eve
bn
bX
bn
bY
bn
bZ
Sˆ S
Fig. 4. The relations between variables/sequences in two-round SKE when Alice starts the protocol and Bob calculates the key
The views of the parties at the end of the second round are V iewA = (Xnff , Y
nb
b ), V iewB =
(Y
nf
f ,X
nb
b ), and V iewE = (Z
nf
f , Z
nb
b ). Using Fano’s inequality for (1b), we have
H(S|V iewA) ≤ H(S|Sˆ) < h(δ) + δH(S), (48)
Furthermore, (1c) gives
I(S;V iewE) = H(S)−H(S|V iewE) ≤ δH(S). (49)
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In the following, we omit the length of the sequences, Xnff , Y
nf
f , Z
nf
f and X
nb
b , Y
nb
b , Z
nb
b from the
superscripts, instead use bold to denote them. H(S) is upper bounded as
H(S)= I(S;V iewA) +H(S|V iewA)
(a)
≤I(S;V iewA)− I(S;V iewE) + h(δ) + 2δH(S)
≤ I(S;V iewA|V iewE) + h(δ) + 2δH(S)
⇒ (1− 2δ)H(S) − h(δ)≤ I(S;V iewA)− I(S;V iewE)
= I(S;Yb) + I(S;Xf |Yb)− I(S;Zf ,Zb)
= I(S;Yb) + I(S;Xf ,Zf |Yb)− I(S;Zf ,Zb)
= I(S;Yb) + I(S;Zf |Yb) + I(S;Xf |Zf ,Yb)− I(S;Zf ,Zb)
= [I(S;Zf ,Yb)− I(S;Zf ,Zb)] + [I(S;Xf |Zf ,Yb)], (50)
where inequality (a) follows from (48) and (49). We separately discuss the two terms in (50). Note that
(S,Zf )↔ Xb ↔ (Yb,Zb) is a Markov chain. If the backward DMBC is stochastically degraded in favor
of Zb, the first term is at most zero; otherwise, letting Xb ↔ Y˜b ↔ Z˜b (see Definition 4), we have
I(S;Zf ,Yb)− I(S;Zf ,Zb)= I(S;Zf , Y˜b)− I(S;Zf , Z˜b)
= I(S;Zf , Y˜b, Z˜b)− I(S;Zf , Z˜b)I(S; Y˜b|Zf , Z˜b)
≤ I(S,Zf ; Y˜b|Z˜b) = I(S,Zf ; Y˜b)− I(S,Zf ; Z˜b)
= I(S,Zf ;Yb)− I(S,Zf ;Zb)
(a)
≤ nb[I(Wb;Yb)− I(Wb;Zb)]
(b)
≤nb[I(Xb;Yb)− I(Xb;Zb)]+. (51)
Inequality (a) follows from the results of message transmission over single DMBCs (e.g., [4, Section
V]), where the conditional distribution PYb,Zb|Xb corresponds to the backward DMBC and Wb is an RV
that satisfies the Markov chain Wb ↔ Xb ↔ (Yb, Zb). Inequality (b) is due to the degradedness of the
backward DMBC. Letting J be an independent random variable uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , nf},
we write the second term in (50) as
I(S;Xf |Zf ,Yb)≤ I(S,Yb;Xf |Zf )
(a)
=I(S,Yb;Xf )− I(S,Yb;Zf )
(b)
=
nf∑
i=1
I(S,Yb;Xf,i|Z
nf
f,i+1,X
i−1
f )− I(S,Yb;Zf,i|Z
nf
f,i+1, Z
i−1
f )
(c)
=
nf∑
i=1
I(S,Yb;Xf,i|Zf,i, Z
nf
f,i+1,X
i−1
f )
= nfI(S,Yb;Xf,J |Zf,J , Z
nf
f,J+1,X
J−1
f , J)
≤ nfI(S,Yb, Z
nf
f,J+1,X
J−1
f , J ;Xf,J |Zf,J). (52)
Equality (a) is due to the Makov chain Zf ↔ Xf ↔ (S,Yb), equality (b) follows from the chain rule for
difference between mutual information (see e.g., [4, Section V]), and equality (c) is due to the Markov
chain Zf,i ↔ Xf,i ↔ (S,Yb).
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Now, letting Vf = (S,Yb, Z
nf
f,J+1,X
J−1
f , J), Xf = Xf,J , Yf = Yf,J and Zf = Zf,J , the conditional
distribution PYf .Zf |Xf corresponds to the forward DMBC, the Markov chain Zf ↔ Xf ↔ Yf ↔ Vf is
satisfied, and we have
I(S;Xf |Zf ,Yb) ≤ nfI(Vf ;Xf |Zf ). (53)
Using the quantities of (51) and (53) in the calculation of (50), H(S) is upper bounded as
H(S)≤
nfI(Vf ;Xf |Zf ) + nb[I(Xb;Yb)− I(Xb;Zb)]+ + h(δ)
(1− 2δ)
=nfI(Vf ;Xf |Zf ) + nb[I(Xb;Yb)− I(Xb;Zb)]+, (54)
where the last equality holds since δ is arbitrarily small. This together with (1a) proves the argument in
(15), and the condition in (15) is proven as follows.
nbI(Xb;Yb)≥ I(Xb;Yb)
(a)
≥ I(Yf ;Yb)
= I(Yb, S;Yf )− I(S;Yf |Yb) ≥ I(Yb, S;Yf )−H(S|Yb)
= I(Yb, S;Yf )−H(S|Yb,Xf )− I(S;Xf |Yb)
(b)
≥ I(Yb, S;Yf )− h(δ) − δH(S) − I(S;Xf |Yb)
(c)
≥ I(Yb, S;Yf )− I(Yb, S;Xf )
(d)
=
nf∑
i=1
I(Yb, S,X
i−1
f , Y
nf
f,i+1;Yf,i)− I(Yb, S,X
i−1
f , Y
nf
f,i+1;Xf,i)
(e)
=
nf∑
i=1
I(Yb, S,X
i−1
f , Y
nf
f,i+1;Yf,i|Xf,i)
(f)
≥
nf∑
i=1
I(Yb, S,X
i−1
f , Z
nf
f,i+1;Yf,i|Xf,i)
= nfI(Yb, S,X
J−1
f , Z
nf
f,J+1;Yf,J |Xf,J , J) = nfI(Vf ;Yf |Xf )− nfI(J ;Yf |Xf )
(g)
=nfI(Vf ;Yf |Xf ). (55)
Inequality (a) is due to the Markov chain Yf ↔ Xb ↔ Yb; inequality (b) follows from (48); inequality
(c) holds since δ is arbitrarily small and so h(δ) + δH(S) is negligible compared to the other quantities;
equality (d) follows from the chain rule for difference between mutual information; equality (e) is due
to the Markov chain Xf,i ↔ Yf,i ↔ (Yb, S,Xi−1f , Y
nf
f,i+1); inequality (f) is due to the Markov chain
Z
nf
f,i+1 ↔ Y
nf
f,i+1 ↔ Yf,i, and equality (g) holds since Yf,J is (i.i.d.) independent of J .
One can prove (16) by symmetry. This implies that, under the condition of this theorem, equality in
(14) holds.
V. CONCLUSION
We extended the results of SKE in the 2DMBC setup in the following two cases. When both DMBCs
have secrecy potential, we proposed the interactive channel coding (ICC) protocol and proved that it
achieves the lower bound. When both DMBCs are stochastically degraded with independent channels
(so called sd-2DMBC), we provided a simplified expression for the lower bound, and proved that this
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lower bound is tight under the condition that one of the parties sends only i.i.d variables. Obtaining a
single-letter characterization or even a tighter upper bound for the secret-key capacity in the sd-2DMBC
setup remains as future work.
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